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Resident Aliens and the Right to Work:
The Quest for Equal Protection
By SIMONA F. ROSALES*
The bosom of America is open to receive not only the opulent
and respectable stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all
nations and -religions; Whom we shall welcome to a participation
of all our rights and privileges, If by decency and propriety of con-
duot they appear to merit the enjoyment.**
George Washington, 1783.
I. Historical Background
Until as recently as 1875 the United States government consistently
followed the open-door policy with respect to immigration.' Persons
from all over the world were not only welcome to enter the United States
but, in many cases, were induced to enter by official and private action.
2
An indication of the benevolent attitude toward aliens3 is the fact
that every one of the original thirteen states permitted aliens to vote.4
During the nineteenth century the laws and constitutions of at least
twenty-two states and territories granted aliens or declarant aliens (here-
inafter referred to as declarants) the right to vote.5
This early attitude of complacency and equality towards the alien
can perhaps be explained by the existing circumstances of that time. The
original thirteen colonies were a "melting pot" of aliens, who had come.
* J.D., 1973, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
** 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 547 (1953).
1. M. KoNvrrz, THE ALm AND nm AsITc iN AMmuCAN LAw 1 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as KoNvrrz).
2. Id.
3. Alien, as used in this discussion, refers to a person who has been lawfully
admitted for permanent residence as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). It does not
include all aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1970).
4. See generally Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 172-73 (1874); Aylsworth;
The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. PoL ScI. REv. 114 (1931).
5. Aylsworth, The Passing of Allen Suffrage, 25 AM. Pol.. Scr. Rnv. 114 (1931);
KoNvr-, supra note 1.
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to this land seeking freedom and opportunity. The push westward made
it increasingly necessary for midwestern states to encourage alien migra-
tion and settlement; one way of attracting aliens was by allowing them
to vote.6
While the midwestern states were adopting constitutions allowing
aliens to vote, the eastern states were legislating to eliminate aliens from
the franchise. The change of heart in the East occurred as a result of the
large influx of Irish immigrants during 1846-1848, which fanned anti-
catholic prejudice and fear that Irish Catholics, controlled by politicians
in Tammany Hall, would take over the government.7 This tension gave
rise to the Native American, or "Know-Nothing Party" which fostered
the passage of the citizenship, long residency and strict literacy require-
ments for voting."
Limitations of the franchise to citizens spread throughout the
states. The last state to amend its constitution to require citizenship as a
condition for voting was Arkansas in 1926.1 To a large extent, the
limitation was a product of fear that in event of war, disloyal enemy
immigrants would take over the American government through the
ballot box.10
Fear, however, was not the only motivating factor that led to the
exclusion of aliens from the franchise. Racism and prejudice played an
important role. As one author put it:
The exclusion of aliens from voting was a product of xenophobic
bigotry not unlike the racial hatred that so long denied the franchise
-to Blacks in America. "Pure blooded Americans" were committed
to upholding their "race" and "pride of birth." Aliens were
menaces, or imagined to be, to their control over politics, religion,
and education."
Another author expressed his concern this way:
We may well ask whether this insweeping immigration is to foreign-
ize us, or we are to Americanize it. Our safety demands the assi-
milation of these strange populations, -and the process of assimila-
tion becomes slower and more difficult as the proportion of foreign-
ers increases.' 2
This sentiment found expression in court decisions:
6. K. PoRTER, HISTORY OF SUFFUGE IN THE UNrrED STATES 112-34 (1918).
7. Id. at 115.
8. Id.
9. See Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. Sci. Rnv. 114
(1931).
10. J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND 214 (1955).
11. Id. at 7.
12. H. GROSE, ALIENS OR AME.ICANS 15 (1906) (Poem by J. Strong).
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The anomalous spectacle of a distinct people, living in our com-
munity, recognizing no laws of this State except through necessity,
bringing with them their prejudices and national feuds, in which
they indulge in open violation of law; whose mendacity is proverb-
ial; a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who
are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a
certain point, as their ihstory has shown; differing in language, opin-
ions, color, and physical conformation; between whom and ourselves
nature has placed an impassable difference, is now presented, and
for them is claimed, not only the right to swear away the life of a
citizen, but the further privilege of participating with us in ad-
ministering the affairs of our Government.
13
While these feelings ran rampant throughout the states, causing
some of them to pass acts affecting the entry of immigrants into their
respective jurisdictions, 14 citizens expressed widespread concern over the
open-door policy. The following poem exemplifies the prevailing atti-
tude of the times:
Unguarded Gates
Wide open and unguarded stand our gates,
And through them presses a wild, motley throng-
Men from the Volga and the Tartar steppes,
Featureless -figures of the Hoang-Ho,
Malayan, Scythian, Teuton, Celt, and Slav,
Flying the old world's poverty and scorn;
These bringing with them unknown gods and rites,
Those, tiger passions, here to stretch their claws.
In street and alley what strange tongues are these,
Accents of menace alien to our air,
Voices that once the Tower of Babel knew!
0 Liberty, White Goddess! Is it well
To leave the gates unguarded? On thy breast
Fold Sorrows children, soothe the hurts of fate,
Lift the downtrodden, but with the hand of steel
Stay those who to thy sacred portals come
To waste the gifts of freedom. Have a care
Lest from thy brow the clustered stars be tom
And trampled in the dust. For so of old
The thronging Goth and Vandal trampled Rome.
And where the temples of -the Caesars stood
The lean wolf unmolested made her lair.' 5
-Thomas Bailey Aldrich
This widespread concern led Congress to begin regulating imi-
13. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854); Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 230
n.11, 466 P.2d 244, 248, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 24 (1970); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711,
720, 198 P.2d 17, 22 (1948).
14. See KoNvrrz, eupra note 1, at 2. Such legislation was held unconstitutional by
the United States Supreme Court in Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
15. H. GRosE, ALIBNS oR AMEmCANS 3 (1906) (Poem by Thomas Bailey Al-
drich).
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gration in 1876.10 Its first regulation merely excluded prostitutes and
convicts." In 1882, other classes of aliens were excluded: lunatics,
idiots, and persons unable to care for themselves without becoming
public charges.' 8 In the same year,'" and in 1884 and 1888, Congress
passed the Chinese exclusion acts;20 only seven years after the first
regulation of immigration, the American Congress undertook to bar a
group of foreigners because of their race or color.21
As if the widespread xenophobia, the exclusion of aliens from the
franchise, and the restrictions by Congress on immigration were not
enough, existing naturalization laws denied certain groups the right to
attain citizenship. From their inception, naturalization laws denied
"white" indentured servants and all "nonwhite" aliens the right to attain
citizenship.2 Aliens of African descent became eligible in 1870,23 but
the native born Indian and Eskimo did not become eligible until 1940.24
Similar barriers were removed for those of Chinese origin in 1943.25
Those of Filipino and East Indian origin became eligible in 1946,28 and
in 1952, persons of Japanese, Korean and other races became eligible
for citizenship.
7
Racism and prejudice seem to have been the motivating factor in
the exclusionary laws. The first California Constitution made similar
restrictions on the basis of color. Its pertinent part provided:
Every white male citizen of the United States, and every white male
citizen of Mexico who shall have elected to become a citizen of the
United States . . . shall be entitled to vote at all elections which
are now or hereafter may be authorized by law ..
Having lost their right to vote in most states, and faced with a
variety of discriminatory restrictions, aliens were left to the mercy of
citizens, politicians, legislators and the courts.
16. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat 477.
17. Id. at § 5; see also KoNvrrz, supra note 1, at 1-2.
18. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
19. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
20. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115; Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25
Stat. 476, 477.
21. KoNvrrz, -supra, note 1, at 2.
22. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103.
23. 16 Stat. 254, 256.
24. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1140.
25. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 600, 601.
26. Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, § 1, 60 Stat. 416.
27. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1422 (1952).
28. CAL. CONsT. art. 2,.§ 1 (1849).
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I. Legislative Restrictions on the Right of
Aliens to Work
At the same time as aliens were losing their right to vote, local
municipalities and states began enacting legislation adversely affecting
aliens in their right to work. A striking example is the famous Yick Wo
v. Hopkins29 case. San Francisco adopted an ordinance requiring a
license to operate a public laundry in a wooden building. Laundries
operating in brick buildings required no license. On its face the ordi-
nance appeared to be nothing other than a fire-protection measure. The
Board of Supervisors, in whom the power to issue licenses was vested,
issued eighty licenses; however, all the licenses, but one, were issued to
whites; two hundred Chinese persons were denied licenses. Writing for
the Court, Mr. Justice Mathews said that the facts shown:
[e]stablish an administration directed so exclusively against a parti-
cular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion,
that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with
their administration . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive
as to amount to a practical denial -by the State of that equal protec-
tion of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other
persons, by the broad and benign provisions of -the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.30
Although the Supreme Court did not pass upon the question of
whether an alien may be prevented by legislation from engaging in the
ordinary pursuits of life, its ruling was significant. It made clear for
those in doubt, that the alien is a person and is entitled to equal
treatment and protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact
that the Court limited its ruling to this issue was, perhaps, a blessing in
disguise. Had the issue been whether a state or municipality has the right
and power to pass legislation preventing aliens from engaging in certain
occupations, the result doubtless would have been to uphold the statute
in question.
Also significant in this case was the requirement that adequate
reason be shown for any discrimination. Absent such a showing the
court would find a denial of equal protection:
No reason whatever, except the will of -the supervisors, is assigned
why they should not be permitted to carry on, in -the accustomed
manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they de-
pend for a livelihood. . . . The fact of this discrimination is ad-
29. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
30. Id. at 373.
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mitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be
resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and
nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of
the law is not justified.31
Whether the San Francisco measure is an illustration of the contin-
ued effort by white Californians to keep their population as white as
possible, or whether it is motivated by economic reasons, is left to
interpretation. The logical conclusion is that it was a combination of
both. There is ample authority supporting this conclusion. Memories of
the struggle with the Indians "prejudiced Californians in favor of an
exclusively white population,"" one author concluded. The editor of the
San Francisco Californian wrote, "The Indians amongst us are . . . a
nuisance. We left the slave states because we did not like to bring up a
family in a miserable condition, which. . . would be inevitable, . . .
surrounded by slavery . . . .We desire only a white population in
California."33 As benign as the propounded reasons may have appeared
for wanting to exclude slavery from California, the underlying reason
was that the rich soil of California attracted speculators in search of land
grants, and that they might develop slave colonies for the cultivation of
rice, cotton and sugar. Even when California was admitted into the
Union as a free state, the idea of massive, slave-supported plantations
lost Aone of its attractiveness.34 At the same time the Chinese created
economic competition for whites engaged in similar occupations; their
availability for exploitation in California posed a continued threat of
competition for the rich lands by Southern speculators. The Negro slaves
had been freed but the concentration of Chinese in California presented
a possible substitute for lost black labor, for it had been but a little over
a decade since Chinese had been used in the South as a source of cheap
labor as a substitute for the slaves. In addition, employers found that
importation of another racial group engaged in menial labor effectively
could bring recalcitrant freedmen to terms.3 5 Chinese workers were used
to build the railroads 6 and to act as strike-breakers in the Eastern
states.
37
The Yick Wo38 case was a direct result of the widespread xeno-
31. Id. at 374.
32. G. BARTH, Brrrn STRFNGTH-A HISTORY Or THE CHNESE IN THE UNnTED
STATES 1850-1870 42 (1964).
33. Id. See also San Francisco Californian, Mar. 15, 1849.
34. Id. at 43.
35. Id. at 188-97.
36. Id. at 195.
37. Id. at 197-98.
38. Supra note 29.
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phobia of that time and of the threat of economic competition; it began
a long list of cases that have since arisen to challenge similar legislation.
Since political influences play an important role in bringing about
legislation of the nature exemplified by Yick Wo, once citizenship was
made a requirement for voting, aliens were unable to oppose it. For
example, in 1926 the Detroit City Council, apparently induced by
certain labor-union cliques who had large control over elections, passed
an ordinance discharging all alien employees of the city. An immediate
reaction, however, combined with the great inconvenience that resulted,
led to the restoration of the conditions that existed prior to the ordi-
nance.
39
Of special significance was a case decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1915. In Truax v. Raich,40 the Court reviewed an
Arizona statute which provided that when anyone employed five or
more persons, not less than eighty percent, or four out of every five, had
to be citizens. As in Yick Wo, the Court held that the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens as well as to
citizens. 4 Furthermore, the Court observed that the state's police power
does not include the authority to deny to aliens the ordinary means of
earning a livelihood.42 "It requires no argument," wrote Justice Hughes
for the majority of the Court, "to show that the right to work for a living
in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of
the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
Amendment to secure." 43  He pointed out that "to deny to aliens the
opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state
would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance
and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot
work." 44 A denial of the right to enter the state is an invasion of the
power to admit and exclude aliens, which is vested exclusively in the
federal government. 45 "[Complainant] was thus admitted with the priv-
ilege of entering and abiding in the United States, and hence of entering
and abiding in any state of the Union, '46 the Court reasoned. The Court
not only asserted the right of aliens to work and reiterated the right of
39. See Note, Constitutionality of Legislative Discrimination Against the Alien in
His Right to Work, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 74 n.4 (1934).
40. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id. at 41.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 39.
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equal protection, but clearly stated that the right to travel and live in any
state of the Union was incidental to the privilege granted when an alien
enters this country.
In distinguishing the case at bar from other cases, however, the
Truax Court recognized the power of a state to make reasonable classifi-
cations in legislating to promote the health, safety, morals and welfare of
those within its jurisdiction. 47 The Court recognized the theory, com-
monly termed "proprietary," whereby citizens are favored over aliens on
the rationale that the state holds its property and resources in trust for its
citizens, the owners.48 It also recognized the right of the state to favor
citizens in public works.49
Thus, despite the favorable ruling in Truax, the struggle against
alien discrimination in the right to earn a living was just beginning. The
three state-imposed restrictions on alien employment, recognized by the
Truax Court, will be discussed at some length.
A. State's Police Power to Regulate Occupations
Under this theory, the state may regulate occupations which it
considers harmful, vicious or antisocial. Courts have not applied strict
equal protection standards to these statutes because, at least on their
face, they appear aimed at occupations, not individuals. In actual prac-
tice, however, the licensing requirements and statutory restrictions are
manipulated with the result that aliens are virtually eliminated from
employment in certain occupations. Little manipulation is needed
once a statute has been passed because the limitations are specific, i.e., to
citizens and to those who declare their intentions to become citizens.
Among the many occupations and professions that have been
closed to aliens because they were considered potentially harmful,
vicious or antisocial are the following: funeral director; 0 embalmer;51
hairdresser; 5z cosmetologist; 53 barber;54 veterinarian; 55 hunter or trap-
per; 5 6 pool room operator;5 7 any employment related to the business
47. Id. at 41.
48. Id. at 40.
49. Id.
50. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 4539 (1949).
51. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.856 (1949).
52. CoNN. Gm. STAT. § 4586 (1949); WASH. RaV. CODE §§ 18, 18.050 (1952).
53. Id.
54. KAs. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1811 (1949).
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 55 (1968).
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4869 (1949); N.D. REv. COD § 20-0110 (1943).
57. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1603 (1955); NEV. CoMp. LAws § 3302 (owner or
operator of gambling device) (Supp. 1949).
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of handling alcoholic beverages5" or "soda pop" or soft drinks;59 real
estate broker;60 peddler;61 pawnbroker; 62 driver of vehicles for hire;63
and other professions which will be discussed later. In denying licenses
to aliens in these occupations, the justifications used imply that the
states involved consider aliens, as a class, to be lacking in necessary
character qualifications. It is also reasonable to conclude that such
states do not trust aliens with animals, a corpse, or even a person's hair
or beard.
Some courts, in upholding these statutes, have, in fact, equated the
status of an alien to that of a convicted felon. The following language is
an example:
It cannot be assumed that the legislature did not have evidence
before it, or that it did not have reasonable grounds to justify the
legislation, as, for instance, that unnaturalized foreign-born per-
sons and persons who have been convicted of a felony (emphasis
added) were more likely -than citizens to unlawfully use firearms or
engage in dangerous practices against the government in times of
peace or war, or to resort to force in defiance of the law. To provide
against such contingencies would plainly constitute a reasonable
exercise of the police power.64
Upholding a statute restricting licenses to operate a pool hall to
citizens, one court reasoned that an alien might be denied the right to
operate a billiard hall because, as ordinarily conducted, the game of
billiards and the places where it is played are conducive to idleness,
dissolute habits and other reprehensible activities.6 5 In Commonwealth
v. Hana,6 6 a peddler's license was refused to an alien because of the
opportunities to swindle purchasers. The court concluded that it was a
58. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 102 (commissioner, secretary, or inspector of the
liquor commission) (1944); IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-509 (retailer of alcoholic beverages)
(Bums 1956); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. H8 243.100, 244.090 (Baldwin 1955).
59. Miller v. Niagara Falls, 207 App. Div. 798, 202 N.Y.S. 549 (1924); But see
George v. Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 P. 681 (1925).
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-24-8 (1954).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-2003 (1955); MASS. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 101, § 22
(1954).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-841 (1950).
63. Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 R.I. 333, 117 A. 359 (1922).
64. In re Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 650, 226 P. 914 (1924); But cf. Raffaelli v.
Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 298, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1972); People v. Salchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 38-9, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971);
People v. Lovato, 258 Cal. App. 2d 290, 296, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1968).
65. Anton v. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (D.C. Ore. 1924); Accord, Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
66. 195 Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907).
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proper exercise of the police power to restrict licenses to those who were
sufficiently attached to the principles of American law to become citi-
zens under the naturalization laws or to native-born Americans.
Approving a statute excluding aliens from the occupation of a
motorbus operator, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that because
"aliens as a class are naturally less interested in the state, the safety of its
citizens, and the public welfare, than citizens of the state, to allow them
to operate motorbuses, would . . . tend to increase the danger to
passengers and to the public using the highways. ' 7
A New York court, upholding a statute restricting to citizens
licenses to sell "soda pop", found the activity dangerous because of the
possibility that the food product could be contaminated,6 if such licen-
ses were extended to aliens. (An Oregon court found a similar ordi-
nance to be arbitrary. 69) Expanding the New York court's reasoning in
the "soda-pop" case would necessitate restricting the following occupa-
tions: farmworkers, housemaids, cooks, grocery clerks, sorters and pack-
agers at warehouses and canneries, and other food processing occupa-
tions, for these offer an even greater risk of food contamination.
Further occupations restricted under state police power are: physi-
cian 7° and other medical-related professions, 71 certified public account-
ant,72 pharmacist,73 teacher 74 and lawyer. 75 Of these professions, the
67. Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 RI. 333, 335, 117 A. 359, 360 (1922).
68. Miller v. Niagara Falls, 207 App. Div. 798, 202 N.Y.S. 549 (1924).
69. George v. Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 P. 681 (1925).
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-611 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-7
(1)(c)(iv) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.05 (Supp. 1956); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. I
66-1003 (Supp. 1957).
71. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 197 (optometrist) (1940); Am. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 32-
1232 (dentist) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-718 (registered nuruse) (1947); CONN.
GEN. STAT. H9 4371 (osteopath), 4402 (Physio-therapy technician), 4828 (nurse), 4508
(mechanical optician), 4556 (chiropodist), 4635 (certified psychologist), 348 (custodian
of institutional patients) (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1151 (oral hygienist)
(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-705 (podiatrist) (1951); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 150.04
(dentist) (Supp. 1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. H§ 67-3-3 (chiropractor), (physical therapist)
(1954); N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 6905 (registered professional nurse) (McKinney 1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.3 (practical nurse) (Supp. 1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59 §
805 (licensed electrologist) (1949); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 277, § 2 (optometrist)
(1938); S.C. CODE § 56-983 (nurse) (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-817 (optometrist)
(1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-20-3 (registered sanitarian) (1953); Wis. STAT. § 149-04
(registered nurse) (1955).
72. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 1 (1940); Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-721 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 71-601 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-1-9(2) (1953); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 116.9 (1949); Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 37-204 (1945).
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4465 (1949); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 68, § 6 (1954);
On-o R v. CODE ANN. § 4729.08 (Baldwin 1953).
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one most litigated appears to be that of a lawyer.76 In Raffaelli v. Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners77 a California court declared such a statutory
prohibition void as abridging the equal protection clauses of the United
States and California Constitutions.78 The Committee of Bar Examiners
advanced five traditional reasons to justify the distinctions drawn be-
tween citizens and aliens:
(1) a lawyer must appreciate the spirit of American institutions;
(2) a lawyer must take an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States and California;
(3) a lawyer must remain accessible to his clients and subject to
the control of the bar;
(4) the practice of law is a privilege, not a right;
(5) and a lawyer is an officer of the court and therefore should be
a citizen."9
Justice Mosk, writing for a unanimous court refuted each of the commit-
tee's arguments:
(1) The federal district courts have approached unanimity in
finding that there is "no rational relationship between 'fitness or capacity
to practice law' and the knowledge of 'local customs'." The United
States Supreme Court has affirmed that a state is prohibited "from
excluding a person from a profession. . . solely because he is a member
of a particular political organization or because he holds certain be-
liefs."80 Even where this is held a valid prerequisite for bar membership,
an overly inclusive classification results in presuming an alien incapable
of meeting the test:
...Nor has it been established that aliens as a class are incapable
of possessing such understanding. Knowledge of this kind is ac-
quired in many ways, both formal and informal. It comes not so
much from the accident of birth as from the experience of the daily
life of the community and the role of government in that life.81
(2) As to the oath requirement based on the maxim that "no man
can serve two masters,"82 the court said "an alien can take this oath,
74. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1303 (Supp. 1957); Thx. Rv. Crv. SrAT. ANN. art.
28916 (Supp. 1956).
75. N.H. REv. LAws ch. 311, § 2 (1955); IA. Rv. STAT. § 37:7 (Supp. 1955); But
see Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1972).
76. See 4 ST. MARY's LJ. 181, 185 (1972).
77. 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972).
78. Id. at 292, 496 P.2d at 1267, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
79. Id. at 296-301, 496 P.2d at 1269-73, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 901-05.
80. Id. at 296; Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
81. Raffaeli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 296, 496 P.2d 1264,
1270, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 902 (1972).
82. 2 BLACKSTONE'S COmmmNTARIs 366-75.
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both legally and as a matter of fact . . . [To inquire into the 'loyalty'
of the prospective lawyer is . . . to skate on very thin constitutional ice
indeed." Furthermore, "we cannot say that aliens as a class are in-
capable of honestly subscribing to this oath.""3 The court compared the
oath to that required of all inductees into the armed forces, in which
resident aliens may be conscripted. 84 "Such an oath," the court said,
"is an even more explicit declaration than the simple affirmation re-
quired of California lawyers. 85
(3) As to inaccessibility to clients, the court reasoned that it can
occur to both citizens and noncitizens, either through death or sickness.
If an alien, because of internment during a time of war with whatever
country, becomes inaccessible to his clients he has more opportunity to
settle his pending legal problems in an orderly manner than during
sickness or death, which are more likely to occur.86
(4) Concerning the question of privilege, the court said that the
practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is
qualified by his learning and his moral character.
8 7
(5) "The traditional expression," the court said, "that a lawyer is
an 'officer of the court' . . . [does not mean that he] is a public office-
holder in the literal sense."88
Before the Raffaelli decision, California had, through legislation
and court challenges, done away with the citizenship requirement for
many professions.89 The Raffaelli decision is important not only because
it allowed aliens to practice law, but because of its rejection of the many
traditional justifications that have been used to bar aliens from certain
professions.
83. 7 Cal. 3d at 297, 496 P.2d at 1270, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (1971).
84. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 454.
85. 7 Cal. 3d at 297, 496 P.2d at 1271, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
86. Id. at 299, 496 P.2d at 1271-72, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04.
87. Id. at 299-300, 496 P.2d at 1272-73, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05.
88. Id. at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
89. Id. at 303; The law of California today permits an alien to earn his livelihood
within our state as a doctor, nurse, banker, certified public accountant, engineer, architect
or a contractor. Moreover, after Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d
645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969), the attorney general formally concluded that citizenship
may not constitutionally be required of those wishing to pursue such occupations as
teacher or peace officer (53 CAL. A=rn. GEN. Op's. 63 (1970), pharmacist, psychologist,
psychiatric technician, clinical social worker, private investigator, or insurance broker
(55 CAL. ATry. GEN. Ops. 80 (1972).
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B. The State's Proprietary Interest in Regulating Certain Occupations
Under this theory the state has advanced two justifications: (1) it
has an interest in the subject matter of the occupation (for example, the
taking of fish and game, or the receiving of aid from public funds,
which the state holds in trust for its citizens); or (2) the state has an
interest in the position itself (for example, government employment or
public works).
1) State Acting as Trustee
This justification enjoyed firm judicial acceptance at one time. In
1876 in McCready v. Virginia,0 a state statute allowed only state
citizens to take or plant oysters in two specific rivers. The United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Waite, held the act
constitutional. Though the statute did not differentiate per se between
United States citizens and aliens, aliens were automatically excluded
since they were not citizens of any state. The declaration of constitution-
ality provided a precedent for later cases involving challenges to legisla-
tion specifically designed to discriminate against aliens. During the
seventy years following the McCready case, thirty-three states passed
statutes discriminating against aliens or nonresidents with respect to
fishing; thirty-seven passed statutes similarly restricting hunting.91
In 1913 the United States Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania
statute which prohibited aliens from killing any wild bird or animal
except in defense of person or property, and to that end making it
unlawful for aliens to own or possess a shotgun or rifle.92 Examining the
motive behind the legislation, M. Konvitz, a legal commentator, said
that one might question the evil the legislature sought to eliminate.
Putting it differently he said: "Did the Pennsylvania legislature have its
eye on the wild bird or on the alien?"93 It is reasonable to assume that if
the legislature had as its purpose the preservation of wild life, it would
have adopted an act prohibiting such killing without singling out the
alien. By upholding the statute the court sanctioned the implication by
Pennsylvania legislature that aliens are more likely than citizens to kill
wild life. Konvitz concluded that the most obvious purpose of the legisla-
90. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
91. KoNvrrz, supra note 1, at 214 nn. 4 and 5.
92. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
93. KoNvrrz, supra note 1, at 216.
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tion was to favor citizens over aliens in the enjoyment of the state's
natural resources.94
Courts in other states have taken a dim view of similar restrictions.
In 1922 the Michigan Supreme Court9 5 held that the state may not
deprive aliens of the right to possess arms under the guise of protection
of game; and in 1936 the Colorado court of last resort"  held a similar
act unconstitutional.
The justification that the state acts as trustee for its citizens has
been eradicated by more recent cases. In Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission,97 the United States Supreme Court held that California's
purported ownership of fish in the ocean off its shores was not sufficient
special public interest to justify prohibiting aliens from fishing its waters
while permitting others to do so:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its au-
thority -thus embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in
this country shall abide "in any state" on an equality of legal
privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.98
An Arizona statute which required aliens to reside in the United
States fifteen years before qualifying for public assistance was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson.99 The
Court, dealing with cases not involving aliens, had previously rejected
the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege."'' 0 In overruling
the statute the Court reasoned that "[a]liens like citizens pay taxes and
may be called into the armed forces."'' Unlike the short-term residents
in the other welfare cases, the Court said, "aliens may live within a
state for many years, work in the state and contribute to -the economic
growth of the state."'1 2 Thus, there can be no special "public interest'
in tax revenues to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis
with American citizens who reside in the state.10 3 Accordingly, the
94. Id. at 218.
95. People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927 (1922).
96. People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936).
97. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
98. Id. at 420.
99. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
100. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
101. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
102. Id. at 377; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
103. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
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Court held that a state that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens, or
to aliens who have not resided in the United States for a specified
number of years, violates the equal protection clause. The Court in
Graham held that the challenged statute impinges on the exclusive
federal power to regulate immigration:
The National Government has "broad constitutional powers in de-
termining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the
period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturali-
zation, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization." [Ci-
tations omitted]. Pursuant to that power, Congress has provided, as
part of a comprehensive plan for the regulation of immigration and
naturalization, that "[a]liens who are paupers, professional beggars,
or vagrants" or aliens "who are likely at any time to become public
charges" shall be excluded from admission into the United States,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(8) and 1182(a)(15), and that any alien
lawfully admitted shall be deported who "has within five years after
entry become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown
to have arisen after entry . . . " 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(8). Ad-
mission of aliens likely to become public charges may be condi-
tioned upon the posting of a bond or cash deposit. 8 U.S.C.:
§1183. But Congress has not seen fit to impose any burden or
restriction on aliens who become indigent after their entry into the
United States. Rather, it has broadly declared: "All persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The protection of this statute has been held to extend to aliens as
well as to citizens.'
04
In Truax v. Raich,05 a case challenging an Arizona statute requir-
ing employers of five or more employees to hire eighty percent citizens
before hiring aliens, the United States Supreme Court considered the
reasonableness of the state restriction on the employment of aliens in
terms of its effect on the right of a lawfully admitted alien to live where
he chooses:
It must also be said that reasonable classification implies action
consistent with -the legitimate interests of the State, and it will not
be disputed that these cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring
them into hostility to exclusive Federal power. The authority to
control immigration-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested solely
in the Federal Government . . . . The assertion of an authority to
deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when law-
fully admitted to the State would be tantamount to the assertion
of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases
they cannot live where they cannot work. And, if such policy were
104. Id. at 377.
105. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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permissible, the practical result would be that those lawfully ad-
mitted to the country under the authority of the acts of Congress,
instead of enjoying a substantial sense and in their full scope the
privileges conferred by the admission, would 'be segregated in such
of the States as chose to offer hospitality. 06
The Court in Graham cited Truax with approval and concluded:
The same is true here, for in the ordinary case an alien, becoming
indigent and unable -to work, will be unable -to live where, because
of discriminatory denial of public assistance, he cannot "secure
the necessities of life, including food, clothing and shelter.' 0 7
Furthermore, the Graham court concluded that state residency re-
quirements that either deny welfare benefits to noncitizens or condi-
tion them on longtime residency amount to the assertion of a right, to
deny entrance and abode, which is inconsistent with federal policy.'
08
The Graham decision dealt the death blow to the first proprietary
interest justification-that of the state acting as trustee for its citizens.
2) State's Proprietary Interest in the Occupations
This proprietary interest justification is an outgrowth of the first
justification. 0 9 In the latter, the state equated its position to that of a
trustee, and as such, it became an employer. As an employer, it had a
proprietary interest in the occupations it offers.
This justification has been accepted by some courts, which
reason that since the state has the absolute right of ownership or
beneficial use of public property, the opportunity to be employed in
public enterprises is a privilege which the state may, in its discretion,
grant or withhold."10
106. Id. at 42.
107. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1971).
108. Id. at 380. The principle of the exclusive federal power to regulate and control
immigration had been reiterated before Graham in several United States Supreme Court
decisions: Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915); See also,
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279
(1904); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893); Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
109. See Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57
CoLum. L. R~v. 1012, 1016 (1957).
110. Id.; Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.
Cal. 1939); Lelande v. Lowery, 26 Cal. 2d 224, 157 P.2d 639 (1945); Lee v. City of
Lynn, 223 Mass. 109, 111 N.E. 700 (1916); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 109 N.E.
427, affd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
111. 214 N.Y. 629, 108 N.E. 1095, aff'd, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
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In Heim v. McCall"' and People v. Crane"2 the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed a statute restricting employment on public
works projects to United States citizens. Several state courts"' had
voided statutes discriminating against aliens in public employment. The
Heim and Crane decisions reversed this trend.
The Heim case challenged Section 14 of the Labor Act of 1909 of
New York which barred aliens from public employment. Petitioner
contended that the statute in question abridged the privileges and im-
munities of the contractors and those of their alien employees in depriv-
ing them of their right of contracting for labor, and that the State of
New York, by enacting and enforcing the law, deprived employers and
employees of liberty and property without due process and denied both
the equal protection of the law. Petitioner also argued that the law was
in violation of the provisions of Articles I and II of the Treaty of 1871
with Italy. The Court reiterated its view that no one has an absolute
right to work for the state. It concluded that the state, like a private
employer, is unrestricted by the Fourteenth Amendment in the area of
public employment.
14
Crane was decided on the authority of Heim. In Crane Judge
Cardozo stated that since state tax money is the common property of its
citizens, an alien has no grounds to question the manner of its dispos-
tion. He further noted that a state may prevent pauperization of its
citizens by discriminating against aliens in granting relief.1 5 The court
applied similar logic to discrimination against aliens in the area of public
employment."1
6
Although for a time courts upheld the rationale, recent court
decisions have been to the contrary."17  The decisions rejecting this
theory have cited two reasons: (1) State statutes in this area encroach
on the overall federal immigration scheme by regulating movement of
112. 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, af'd, 293 U.S. 195 (1915).
113. See Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, supra note 109,
at 1017 nn.34, 35.
114. Heim v. McCall, 214 N.Y. 629, 108 N.E. 1095, aftId, 239 U.S. 175, 187-88
(1915).
115. People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 164, 108 N.E. 427, 430 (1915).
116. Id. But see the dissenting opinion by Collin, J., 214 N.Y. at 186-99, 108 N.E. at
438-42.
117. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 370-80 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948);
P'urdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 572-73, 81-82, 456 P.2d 645, 649-50, 79
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969); Department of Labor and Indus. v. Cruz, 45 N.J. 372, 212 A.2d
545 (1965).
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aliens within the United States; (2) such statutes are repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment in that they create discriminatory classifications
which cannot be justified by an overriding public interest.
C. Federal Employment
United States v. Lovett 18 was one of the first cases that raised the
question of whether an individual has a right to work for the federal
government. Lovett and other petitioners had been working for the
government for several years. The government agencies which had
carefully selected them for employment were fully satisfied with the
quality of their work and wished to keep them in their jobs. Petitioners
were among a long list of persons whom Congressman Martin Dies
publicly had accused of affiliating with "Communist front organiza-
tions." He urged Congress to refuse to appropriate monies for their
salaries. Congress complied with Dies' request by passing Section 304 of
the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 which cut off peti-
tioners' compensation through regular disbursing channels and perma-
nently barred them from government employment. Petitioners were not
afforded an opportunity to challenge Dies' accusations.
The Court in Lovett reasoned that legislative acts, no matter what
their form may be, that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution."" The Court concluded that Section 304 operates as a
legislative decree of perpetual exclusion from a chosen vocation, and
that such permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the
government is punishment, and of the most severe type. 20 The Lovett
case, while conceding that permanent proscription from government
service is punishment, requiring the safeguard of the Sixth Amendment,
did not hold that an individual has a right to work for the federal gov-
ernment.
Even though the petitioners in Lovett were citizens, its holding can
be used to challenge existing legislation barring aliens from government
employment. Aliens are a "ready identifiable group of persons" who are
subject to blanket discrimination in government employment, both state
and federal. Such legislation barring aliens from government employ-
ment operates as a "legislative decree of perpetual exclusion from a
118. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
119. Id. at 315; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 3.
120. Id. at 315.
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chosen vocation;" and, as in the Lovett case, such permanent proscrip-
tion from an opportunity to work for the government is punishment.
The government may argue that unlike petitioners in the Lovett case,
who were already working for the government, aliens do not have a
vested right. In view of the reasoning used by the courts to invalidate
state statutes in this area, this argument must be rejected. Aliens serve in
the armed forces, 2' pay federal taxes,122 and are entitled to equal
protection of the laws like all citizens. 2 '
Eisler v. United States"" involved an Austrian national who ar-
rived in this country as a political refugee. He was summoned by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities to appear as a witness
before the committee. The committee cited him for contempt of Con-
gress when he refused to testify. In denying this appeal, the Supreme
Court noted that although appellant was an alien, he stood before the
Committee in much the same position as any citizen of the United States
and was equally subject to congressional sanctions. 125 The Court added:
Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he be-
comes invested with the rights, except those incidental to citizen-
ship, guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our bor-
ders ...Correlatively, an alien resident owes a temporary alleg-
iance to the Government of the United States, and he assumes duties
and obligations which do not differ materially from those of native-
born or naturalized citizens; he is bound to obey all the laws of the
country, not immediately relating to citizenship, and is equally
amenable with citizens for any infraction of those laws.' 26
The Constitution contains only three restrictions with respect to
aliens: (1) only a natural-born citizen of the United States may be
president of the United States; (2) no person shall be a representative
who shall not have. . . been seven years a citizen of the United States;
and (3) no person shall be a senator who shall not have. . . been nine
121. The 1971 amendments to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50
U.S.C.A. App. §§ 453, 454 (1972). See generally Roh & Upham, The Status of Aliens
Under United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1972); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
122. 26 U.S.C.A. § 871 et seq. (1967); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State,
71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
124. 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
125. Id. at 279.
126. Id.
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years a citizen of the United States.2 7 The right to pursue a lawful
occupation is neither limited nor specifically established by the Constitu-
tion.
In Meyer v. Nebraska128 the Supreme Court defined the term
"liberty" as follows:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, (emphasis added) .. .
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'29
The Meyer case overruled a state law forbidding, under penalty, the
teaching, in any school, of any modem language other than English.
While the Court recognized a valid state interest in trying to American-
ize foreigners, it ruled that the statute, as construed and applied, unrea-
sonably infringed the liberty guaranteed to Meyer by the Fourteenth
Amendment, namely, that "[n]o state shall . . .deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'
30
Prior to the ruling in Meyer, other cases had made similar declara-
tions that an individual has the right to engage in any of the common
occupations of life.'' Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State13 2 involved a chal-
lenge to California Labor Code section 1850 limiting the employment of
aliens on public works. The California Supreme Court held, inter alia,
that employment in a particular occupation is a significant if not funda-
mental interest. In the court's view, a state may not arbitrarily fore-
close to any person the right to pursue an otherwise lawful occupation. 33
In Greene v. McElroy' the United States Supreme Court, in revers-
ing an administrative determination which deprived the petitioner of
127. U.S. CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 5 (president); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (representative);
id., § 3, cl. 3 (senator).
128. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
129. Id. at 399.
130. Id.
131. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1907); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884);
Slaughter-House Case 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
132. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
133. Id. at 579, 456 P.2d at 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
134. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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his security clearance, and therefore of his job, referred to employ-
ment as a cherished right." 8 The view that the right to pursue a chosen
occupation is a fundamental right also finds some support in language in
the Declaration of Independence and in the United States Constitution
which imply that such a right exists. The Declaration of Independence
states that all persons should enjoy certain inalienable rights: life, liber-
ty and the pursuit of happiness. The Thirteenth Amendment of the
Constitution declares that "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States ... .
Since life cannot exist without the means of sustenance, implicit in
the right to life is the right to pursue the means to support life. For most
people employment is the only source of sustenance. If, because of
legislative restrictions, aliens, otherwise qualified to enter certain occu-
pations, are forced to work in the least desirable jobs in order to survive,
the situation is tantamount to slavery. Thus, one can argue that, implicit
in the right to live, to be free and to pursue happiness is the right to
pursue the occupation of one's choice, as the Court declared in Meyer v.
Nebraska.'
In the civil service area the recent trend, despite early discrimina-
tion, has been favorable toward aliens. In 1971, for example, a group of
Chinese residents of the United States sought to overturn the Civil
Service Commission's regulation excluding aliens from competitive civil
service in the case of Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton. s'8 The district court
held that civil service regulations excluding aliens who do not owe
permanent allegiance to the United States from competitive civil service
do not violate Executive Order No. 11478 prohibiting discrimination
based upon race, color, religion, sex or national origin, within the
federal government.13 9 The Court granted the governments motion to
dismiss.
In Jalil v. Hampton,'40 the circuit court was presented with the
following questions: (1) Whether the Civil Service Commission, conso-
nant with the Fifth Amendment, may deny to a resident alien the
opportunity to take the competitive examination for federal civil service
employment, and (2) Whether appropriation acts may prohibit the use
135. Id. at 507.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
137. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
138. 333 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
139. Id. at 532-33; see 3 C.F.R. 207 (Supp. 1974).
140. 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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of appropriated funds to pay aliens employed in the civil service of the
United States. The court noted that this case did not involve a discharge
of an employee already appointed to a federal position. In such cases it
has been held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment cir-
cumscribes arbitrary dismissals. 4 ' The court refused to rule on the
questions presented and remanded the case to the lower court. Chief
Judge Bazelon strongly dissented. He considered the remand unneces-
sary. In his dissent, he said:
The Civil Service regulation which excludes all aliens from ad-
mission to competitive examination violates the Constitution under
the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Richardson . . . . The principles announced in Graham apply
fully to the federal government. . 142
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 43 the United States Supreme Court found
a New York statute excluding noncitizens from state civil service em-
ployment unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court limited the holding to the case at bar, however, stating that,
while it ruled the statute in question unconstitutional, it did not invali-
date all refusals to hire or discharge for noncitizenship; such actions, if
based on legitimate state interests that relate to the qualifications for a
particular position or to the characteristics of the employee would be
adjudged on a case-by-case basis. 144 The Court said: "We hold only that
a flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions that have little, if
any, relation to a State's legitimate interest cannot withstand scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment."'
45
This limited holding extends somewhat the decision in Greene v.
McElroy, 1 8 wherein the United States Supreme Court found that ad-
ministrative agencies have no authority to make decisions of constitu-
tional import. 47 The Court ruled that agencies are empowered to
conduct routine administrative business but, without formal authoriza-
tion, they may not deal with areas affecting basic human rights.148
Where "substantial restraints on employment opportunities of numerous
141. Id. at 925; accord, Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
142. Jalil v. Hampton, 460 F.2d 923, 930 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972). Accord, Nielson v. Secretary of Treasury, 424 F.2d 833, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
143. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
144. Id. at 646-47.
145. Id. at 647.
146. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
147. Id. at 506-07.
148. Id. at 507.
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persons are imposed in a manner which is in conflict with our long-
accepted notions of fair procedures," the Court demands a showing of
explicit congressional authorization. 149 It has been suggested that "there
is no express congressional authorization permitting discrimination
against aliens in the competitive civil service."' 150 As a result a new de-
velopment questioning the authority of the Civil Service Commission in
the area of employment, growing out of the Dougall and the Greene de-
cisions, has opened the door to aliens in civil service employment.
In a recent decision, Wong v. Hampton,'5' the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the U.S. Civil Service Commission regulation
excluding resident aliens from employment in federal competitive civil
service violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 52
In Wong the government set forth various arguments in support of
its position that there is a compelling governmental interest offsetting
any discrimination on the basis of alienage. These arguments are:
(1) the Government has a right to provide for the economic se-
curity of its citizens before its resident aliens;
(2) resident aliens have no constitutional right to make or carry
national policy or partake in any of the institution of Gov-
ernment;
(3) considerations of loyalty and security prevent the Government
from hiring aliens;
(4) the constitutional qualifications for high political office sup-
port the proposition that control of the Government should be
in the hands of citizens only; and
(5) the universal practice of other nations is to require civil ser-
vants to be citizens.1
53
Some of these same arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court
in Sugarman'54 wherein it considered whether New York had shown a
compelling interest justifying its discriminatory classification. When ap-
plied to federal discrimination, the arguments broke down for similar
reasons.' 5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically rejected the
Government's arguments and concluded that the regulations unreasona-
149. Id. at 506-07.
150. Note, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door? 61 GEo. IJ. 207, 209
(1972).
151. 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 3067
(1974).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1039-40.
154. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
155. Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974).
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bly discriminated against aliens solely on the basis of their alienage.'8 6
Furthermore, the court pointed out that "there is no logical or persua-
sive reason advanced as to why aliens should be excluded from all
federal civil service employment. . . . The broad sweep [of the
regulations] is the vice. It could be saved only by a compelling govern-
mental interest."'157 This decision is the most recent example of the
gradual trend toward eradication of alien discrimination in civil service
employment.
D. Discrimination by Private Employers
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin. 58 The statute itself did not define "national origin", and left the
question of whether citizenship discrimination constitutes national origin
discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the courts. The EEOC in 1972 issued a "guideline" stat-
ing that "[b]ecause discrimination on the basis of citizenship has the
effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin, a lawfully immi-
grated alien who is domiciled or residing in this country may not be dis-
criminated against on the basis of his citizenship. . .."15s
The Fifth Circuit Court in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., e0
faced with the issue of whether petitioner's action was barred by the
statute of limitations in a case involving employment discrimination on
the basis of race, stated:
It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to make sure that the [Civil
Rights] Act [of 1964] works, and the intent of Congress to outlaw
racial discrimination in employment is not hampered by a com-
bination of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with
semantics.' 6'
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,162 another case involving racial
discrimination in employment, the United States Supreme Court stated
that EEOC guidelines are entitled to "great deference."1 ' However, in a
more recent decision by the Court, Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing
156. Id. at 1040.
157. Id. at 1041.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
159. 29C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1972).
160. 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
161. Id. at 891.
162. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
163. Id. at 433-34.
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Co., 6 4 the EEOC guideline issued on the question of alien discrimina-
tion, and other relevant court interpretations on the subject, were disre-
garded.
Espinoza involved the interpretation of the phrase "national origin"
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Petitioner was a lawfully
admitted resident alien married to a United States citizen. She sought
employment with the Farah Company and her application was rejected
on the basis of a longstanding company policy against the employment
of aliens. Since persons of Mexican ancestry made up more than 96 per-
cent of the employees at the company's San Antonio division (97 per-
cent of those doing the work for which petitioner applied), it was clear
to the Court that Farah's refusal to employ petitioner was solely on the
basis of citizenship."6 5 The Court recognized two dangers in allowing
employers to discriminate on the basis of citizenship:
(1) In some instances, a citizenship requirement might be but one
part of a wider scheme of unlawful national-origin discrimina-
tion;
(2) [I]n other cases, an employer might use a citizenship test as a
pretext to disguise what is in fact national-origin discrimina-
tion. 66
The Court acknowledged that Title VII prohibits discrimination on
the basis of citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discrimi-
nating on the basis of national origin. "The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimi-
natory in operation."'1 67 But, in an attempt to answer the question before
it, the Court said that the term "national origin" on its face refers to the
country where a person was born, or more broadly, the country from
which his or her ancestors came.168 The Court found compelling reasons
to believe that Congress did not intend the term "national origin" to
embrace citizenship requirements:
Since 1914, the Federal Government itself, through Civil Service
Commission regulations, has engaged in what amounts to dis-
crimination against aliens by denying them the right to enter compe-
titive examination for federal employment.' 6 9
164. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
165. Id. at 92.
166. Id.
167. Id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
168. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
169. Id. at 89; Exec. Order No. 1997, H.R. Doc. No. 1258, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., 118
(1914); see 5 U.S.C. § 3301; 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1972).
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The Court also found that the legislative history revealed no men-
tion of any intent on Congress' part to reverse the longstanding practice
of requiring federal employees to be United States citizens. "To the con-
trary," the Court said, "there is every indication that no such reversal
was intended. Congress itself has on several occasions since 1964 enact-
ed statutes barring aliens from federal employment." 170 The Court
concluded: "To interpret the term 'national origin' to embrace citizen-
ship requirements would require us to conclude that Congress itself has
repeatedly flouted its own declaration of policy. This Court cannot
lightly find such a breach of faith.' 17' The Court reasoned that while the
EEOC guidelines are entitled to great deference, "that deference must
have limits where, as here, application of the guideline would be incon-
sistent with an obvious congressional intent not to reach the employment
practice in question." Furthermore, the Court said that "[c]ourts need
not defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are
'compelling indications that it is wrong'.' 72
If the Espinoza Court had wished to include citizenship discrimina-
tion within Title VII coverage, it could have found ample precedent to
justify its action. Previous court decisions have touched upon the issue,
using the term "nationality" interchangeably with "alienage." In Truax
v. Raich,17 3 speaking of the state's authority to make reasonable classifi-
cations, the Court said in relevant part: "But this admitted authority,
with the broad range of legislative discretion that it implies, does not go
so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to lawful inhabitants,
because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a
livelihood.""' 4 The case involved the issue of citizenship discrimination.
Before Truax, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7 5 the Court used similar lan-
guage in referring to Chinese aliens: "The Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens .... These
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality."'7 0
170. Id. at 90; See also The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriation Act of 1973 Pub. L. 92-351, § 602, 86 Stat. 487; Pub. L. 91-144, § 502,
83 Stat. 336; Pub. L. 91-439, § 502, 84 Stat. 902.
171. Id. at 90-91.
172. Id. at 94-95.
173. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
174. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
175. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
176. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
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It is quite natural to think of national origin discrimination as
discrimination against a more or less clearly defined class of people
identified with some foreign nation. Other characteristics that are almost
exclusively associated with national origin are surname, language, and
accent. On the other hand, when one thinks of racial discrimination, it is
natural to associate with race such characteristics as facial features, hair
color and texture, height, and skin color. Aliens necessarily possess one
or more of the characteristics associated with national origin. Conse-
quently, they automatically fall within the scope of national origin
discrimination. On the basis of the Espinoza decision, any employer
wishing to discriminate against a certain group of people having any of
these characteristics may do so if the victims of discrimination are aliens.
The employer is only prohibited from arbitrarily discriminating against
those members of the group who are citizens.
Blanket discrimination against aliens by private employers, permit-
ted by the Espinoza court, can have very serious consequences. In
California, for example, farmers who oppose efforts by farmworkers and
their leaders to organize and join a union, may use the authority,
granted to private employers by Espinoza, to regain control over dissi-
dent farmworkers, most of whom are noncitizens. Farmers may begin
hiring solely on the basis of citizenship. So far, some have used illegal
aliens as their main weapon against the farmworkers who engage in
strikes and boycotts. What is there to stop them from using one more
weapon, citizenship, against the farmworkers?
Another example of the possible consequences of the Espinoza
ruling arises in the case of the Vietnamese refugees. Even though they
are here at the grace of the federal government, as were the Cuban refu-
gees, the private employer may legally discriminate against them. If every
private employer in the nation were to utilize this type of discrimination
to threaten or control workers, the effect on labor-management relations
could be severe.
The national consequences of the Espinoza decision in the private
labor market might be more serious than similar discrimination by state
and federal government. Government discrimination can be overcome
by the aliens who are otherwise qualified for the restricted occupations,
for they tend to be better qualified for citizenship due to their training
and education. The bulk of the alien population hired by private em-
ployers generally are less literate and may never acquire the proficiency
in English necessary to qualify for citizenship.
A refusal by private employers to hire aliens would be tantamount
to voiding the privileges accorded by Congress to aliens upon entry into
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this country. In Espinoza the Court seems to extend to private employers
what it prohibits to the states-regulation and control over immigration.
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a strong dissenting opinion in Espinoza.
He said that the construction placed upon the "national origin" provi-
sion is inconsistent with the construction the Court had placed upon the
same Act's protections for persons denied employment on account of
race or sex. 177 "In connection with racial discrimination," he said, "we
have said the Act prohibits 'practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,' if they create 'artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers op-
erate insidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermis-
sible classifications."' 71 8 Comparing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.17 9 with
the case at bar, Justice Douglas noted, "[tihe tests involved in Griggs did
not eliminate all applicants of foreign origin. Respondent here explicitly
conceded that the citizenship requirement is imposed without regard to
the alien's qualifications for the job."' 80 He concluded that the protec-
tion enunciated in Griggs extended a fortiori to the case at bar. The
same principle applies to cases on sex discrimination.' 8 Furthermore,
he stated that the construction placed upon the statute in the majority
opinion is an extraordinary departure from prior cases, and was opposed
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency
charged by law with the responsibility of enforcing the act's protec-
tions.' 82 He concluded his dissent:
The majority decides today that in passing sweeping legislation
guaranteeing equal job opportunities the Congress intended to help
only the immigrant's children excluding those "for whom there
[is] no place at all." I cannot impute that niggardly intent to Con-
gress. 183
In Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 84 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with deciding whether Section 1981 of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act"8 5 extends its protection to aliens and whether
it applies to private employers. The court answered both questions
177. 414 U.S. 86, 96 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 96-7.
179. 401 U.S. 424(1971).
180. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 97 (1973).
181. Id.; see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
182. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 97 (1973).
183. Id. at 99.
184. 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
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affirmatively. It observed that although the original enactment was limit-
ed to remedying racial discrimination, the section was subsequently
broadened to include "all persons" in order to bring aliens within its
coverage. 8" Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court had ex-
plicitly stated that Section 1981 applies to aliens. 87
The offending employer and union argued that a suit based on
Section 1981 requires a showing of state action. The court said that its
prior decisions foreclosed this argument.' 88 In Sanders v. Dobbs Houses,
Inc.," "' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 1981
extends to private discrimination in employment, and the court has
reaffirmed Sanders many times since. 9 '
Although Guerra granted relief under Section 1981, it relied on
Espinoza in denying relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. It also held that denying relief under Title VII does not preclude
petitioner from alleging violations under both. In view of the-holding in
Guerra, would Espinoza'9' have been decided differently if petitioner
had also alleged violation of Section 1981? On the basis of the two recent
United States Court of Appeals decisions, Wong v. Hampton9 ' and
Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 93 one may conclude that the
authority of Espinoza is under serious challenge, despite the following
of Espinoza by the Guerra Court.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Espinoza relied heavily on
federal Civil Service discrimination against aliens. Now that the Court
of Appeals in Wong has upheld a challenge to U.S. Civil Service Com-
mission regulations excluding resident aliens from employment in federal
competitive civil service, the pillar supporting Espinoza appears to be
crumbling about the base.
MI. Consequences of Legislative Restrictions on the
Right of Aliens to Work
Legislation which restricts aliens from engaging in the occupation
of their choice forces them to work in the most undesirable and low
186. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d at 653-54.
187. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
188. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 654 (5th Cir. 1974).
189. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
190. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 654 (5th Cir. 1974).
191. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
192. 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974).
193. 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
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paying jobs. Indirectly it forces aliens to resort to public assistance or
criminal activities in order to survive in the "land of the free." As W.H.
Auden wrote:
Hunger allows no choice
To the citizen or the police;
We must love one another or die.' 94
California, with its large agricultural industry, provides a good
example of how aliens are utilized to do the most undesirable jobs.
Farmwork is not only in the minimum or subminimum wage category,
but is also a hard, dirty, and hazardous job. As Father Day described
the farmworkers in Stockton:
Many of the workers came from Mexico and were exploited both
on the job and by the merchants in the town...195
The author is a priest, who worked with farmworkers in Stockton.
He was assigned to St. Mary's Church, which is in the heart of what is
commonly known as "skid row." He portrays the "shape-up" as the
place "where farmworkers were recruited by farm labor contractors
and herded into buses like animals in the wee hours of the morning. The
strong were taken, the weak were left behind."' 90 His description of the
place is very limited, but he is correct in describing the people being
herded into buses in the "wee hours of the morning." 197
Another writer described the Stockton farmworker in the 1960's as
follows:
People work ten-, eleven-, and twelve-hour days in temperatures
over one hundred degrees. Sometimes there is no drinking water;
sometimes big common barrels of it are used. Women and chil-
dren work on ladders and with hazardous machinery. (The In-
dustrial Welfare Commission was told in 1961 that 500 children
are maimed each year). Babies are brought to the fields and are
placed in "cradles" of wood boxes.' 98
His estimate of migrants in the Stockton area are: one third "An-
glos," another third Mexican-American; about fifteen percent Filipinos,
and the rest Blacks. 9 Of the one third who are Mexican-American,
194. M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 2 (1962).
195. M. DAY, FORTY AcREs 16 (1965).
196. Id. The earlier the workers showed up at the "shape-up", the better their
chances of getting recruited and of getting a better choice of jobs, e.g., working with a
long-handled hoe instead of with a short-handled hoe.
197. This author's initiation into California occurred at this very same location.
Father Day omitted from his description the dilapidated buildings, the odor of urine,
liquor, tobacco and greasy food which, combined, added to the already depressing state
of the farmworkers.
198. M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 50 (1962).
199. Id.
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it is not clear how many are resident aliens because statistics are inaccur-
ate. Father Day states that about forty per cent of the harvest hands in
the Delano area are "green-carders," or resident aliens from Mexico.200
Neither of these estimates accounts for those who were born of alien
parents in the poverty trap and have followed their parents' footsteps.20 '
As a further illustration of the farmworkers' plight, a recent peti-
tion for writ of review filed with the California Supreme Court in San
Francisco by a group of farmworkers, adequately describes one of the
hazards of the occupation. Petitioners challenged the arbitrary refusal by
the Industrial Safety Board to prohibit the use of the short-handled
hoe.202 The Board held public hearings in San Francisco, El Centro, and
Salinas to determine whether the use of the short-handled hoe falls
within the prohibited practices described in Sections 6400, 6401 and
6403 of the California Labor Code. 203 The Board heard extensive testi-
mony from farmworkers and growers regarding the pain and dis-
comfort caused by the widespread use of this type of hoe; and heard
testimony from five physicians on the effects of the extended use of the
short-handled hoe. The testimony of the physicians was unanimous
that the use of this tool causes severe pain and results in permanent back
injury.20 4 One petitioner who has been working with the short-handled
hoe for ten years, feels that it is the most difficult and lowest paying job
in the state. He stated:
We farmworkers who make our living out working in the fields find
ourselves having to return to work everyday with backs, necks, and
legs that still hurt from working the day before. I do not wish to
work with the short handle hoe. It is not a human type of job.
No one should be expected to work bended down for that length
of time. Short handle hoe work is too hard to do. The short handle
200. M. DAY, FORTY AcREs 29 (1965).
201. M. HARIUNOTON, THE OTmR AMERICA 21 (1962).
202. Brief for Petitioner at 36; Carmona v. Division of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303,
530 P.2d 161, 118 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975).
203. Id. at 35; CAL. LAB. C. § 6400, provides: "Every employer shall furnish em-
ployment and a place of employment which are safe for the employees therein;" CAL.
LA. C. § 6401 provides in pertinent part: "Every employer shall .. . adopt and use
practices, means, methods, operations, and processes, which are reasonably adequate to
render such employment and place of employment safe. Every employer shall do every
other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety of employees;" and CAL.
LAB. C. § 6403 provides in pertinent part: "No employer shall fail or neglect: ....
(b) To adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render the em-
ployment and place of employment safe; (c) To do every other thing reasonably neces-
sary to protect the life and safety of employees."
204. Brief for Petitioner at 36, Carmona v. Division of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d
303, 305 P.2d 161, 118 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975).
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hoe ruins the farmworker's back, and before he is 50, he is so dis-
abled he must go on welfare.
20 5
The other petitioners gave similar declarations.20 6 Dr. David Flanagan,
an orthopedic surgeon in San Francisco, testified inter alia, that he spent
more than two years in a clinic for migrant and seasonal farmworkers
in the Imperial Valley of California. 0 7 He further testified:
From the very outset I began to see what I considered an inordin-
ately high percentage of low back conditions ...
My contention is that if the farmworker is able to stand erect
using a tool which does not require the hyperflexion of the spine
that much of the pathology which I see at the clinic could be eli-minated or delayed by changing the stresses which when applied to
this region of the spine create a progressive degeneration or wear-
ing out of the structure of the low back region.
20 8
Another specialist in orthopedic surgery, Dr. Robert Murphy, also testi-
fied at length and concluded that the use of the short handle hoe, which
[pilaces great stresses on the intervertebral disc of the spine . . .
accelerates the development of degenerative disease of the spine
which occur secondary to the disc degeneration. As the disc de-
generates, they can no longer tolerate this stress. The stress is
transmitted to the bones and to the other joints which is the disease
we call arthritis. The degeneration occurs in the joints and the
bones as well as in the intervertebral disc. Performance of even
simple activities while in the bent position adds further stress, which
are magnified many times over what they would be in an erect posi-
tion. The result of this is a worker whose spine ages more rapidly
than the rest of his body until a point is reached where he is no
longer able to work because of low back pain.
20 9
In addition to the oral testimony by the five physicians, the Board
received written statements from six doctors. 210 Evidence was also
presented to the effect that an alternate tool exists, the long handle hoe,
to do the same jobs.
211
Despite all the evidence presented, the Board rejected the peti-
tion.2 12 An appeal to the California Supreme Court followed. The Court
205. Id. at 5-7.
206. Id. at 10-11.
207. Id. at 15.
208. Id. at 10-11.
209. Id. at 15.
210. Id. at 18.
211. Id. at 7-9.
212. Id. at 21; The reasons for denying the petition were as follows:
1. Testimony failed to prove the tool unsafe.
2. Some workers have been found quite resistant to back deterioration even after many
years of short-hoe usage.
3. Safety orders are not ideally suited to control of body deterioration problems, in part
1060 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 2
held that the agency erred in confining the regulations' ban of "unsafe
tools" to improperly manufactured or improperly maintained imple-
ments.2" 3 It ordered a broader definition of "unsafe tools", more in keep-
ing with the liberal construction of safety legislation for the purpose of
achieving a safe working environment. The Court rejected the petition-
ers' urgings that it determine the short-handled hoe to be unsafe as a
matter of law, taking the view that such determination is properly a
judgment to be made in the first instance by the agency applying the
proper legal standard. 14 It ordered issuance of a writ of mandate
directing the agency to set aside its decision and reconsider the matter in
accordance with the views expressed in the opinion.
Farmwork has been used as an example of one of the few menial
occupations that have not been restricted by any of the states. It should
shed some light on the real motive behind the legislation barring aliens
from many occupations.
IV. Conclusion
A careful examination of the existing immigration laws leads to the
conclusion that the concerns and justifications expressed by government
officials and courts in upholding discriminatory legislation are unfound-
ed.
To begin with, aliens are carefully screened prior to entry and the
screening process continues after entry. Before entering the United
States, the prospective immigrant is required to disclose almost all of his
or her background and to substantiate it with documentation, including
birth and marriage certificates, if married; if male, a military record;
occupation; letters from appropriate police authorities from every place
he or she has resided prior to application; place of destination after entry
and purpose for coming to this country.215 All this information is on the
application he or she must sign under oath and in the presence of a
consular officer.21 6 In addition, the alien is registered and fingerprinted,
and must submit to a physical and mental examination.217 If he or she
because any acceptable regulation would require built-in exceptions to adjust for wide
variations in individual susceptibility to damage.
4. Back deterioration is a widespread problem associated with so many activities and
operations both on and off the job, that effective control depends mainly upon far-
reaching changes in established attitudes and modes of living.
213. Carmona v. Division of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303, 313, 530 P.2d 161,
167-68, 118 Cal. Rptr. 473, 479-80 (1975).
214. Id.
215. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a), (b), (c) (1970).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1201.
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fails the examination, an affidavit of support and or a bond is usually
required before entry is allowed.21 8 This ensures that no alien will
become a public charge immediately upon entry into the country.
On the long list of excludable aliens are those seeking to enter the
United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor.
They are not admitted unless the Secretary of Labor determines and
certifies to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (a)
there are not sufficient workers where the alien is going, who are able,
willing and qualified at that time to do the work in question, and (b)
employment of such alien(s) will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly em-
ployed.219
After entry, the alien continues to undergo a screening through the
following: (1) mandatory notification within ten days to the Immigra-
tion Service of any change of address;2 0 (2) compulsory yearly regis-
tration with the Immigration Department;22' (3) arbitrary stopping and
questioning by immigration or border patrol officers, if the alien is
unfortunate enough to "fit the mold" the officers have set of what an
illegal alien looks like.222
Congress encourages professionals to enter the country by giving
them high priority in visa granting and allocation. 2 3 The reason given
for such priority is that because of "their exceptional ability in the
sciences or the arts [t]hey will substantially benefit prospectively the
national economy, cultural interests or welfare of the United States. 224
Given Congress' attitude, as expressed in the aforegoing statute, it would
appear that state legislation which seeks to bar aliens from professional
occupations is contrary to the intent of Congress.
2 25
Furthermore, several Supreme Court decisions indicate that legisla-
tion by the states restricting the right of aliens to earn a living encroach-
es on the exclusive federal power to regulate and control immigration.
2 6
218. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (7), (g).
219. Id. at § 1182(a)(14).
220. Id. at § 1305.
221. Id. at § 1302.
222. Id. at § 1357(a). The attorney general has empowered the officers of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to enforce section 1357(a); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(c)
(1971). See Note, Temporary Detention of Aliens, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 593 (1972).
223. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) - (h) (1970).
224. Id. at § 1153 (a)(3).
225. Id.
226. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1971).
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This type of legislation is also in violation of provisions in commercial
treaties between the United States and other countries.227
The xenophobic fear of aliens' potential criminal propensities is
irrational because there is no proven correlation between alienage and
criminality.228 As the California Supreme Court observed: "It is com-
mon knowledge that several million aliens are living in this country and
that the vast majority are peaceful and law-abiding. Undoubtedly, many
are serving or have children serving in the armed forces. . .. [A]
person does not demonstrate instability, nor does he show a tendency
towards crime, simply because he is not a citizen of this coutry."229 It
has been demonstrated that the reasons propounded for excluding aliens
from certain occupations and professions are anachronisms born in a
period of racial prejudice combined and flamed by a fear of competition
in the labor market.28 0 Many of these statutes have been declared to be
unconstitutional because they fall short of their "meritorious" rationales.
The authorities cited throughout this article lend support to the
conclusion that legislative discrimination against aliens in their right to
227. For discussion of commercial treaties between the United States and other
countries having specific reference to professional activities, i.e., treaties guaranteeing
rights to engage in professions and occupations, see 52 MrcH. L. RPov. 1184 (1954).
228. See Note, Constitutionality of Legislative Discrimination Against the Alien in
His Right To Work, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 79 n.28 (1934).
229. Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 298, 496 P.2d 1264,
1271, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 903 (1972); People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 38, 489 P.2d
1361, 1368, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971).
230. Mr. Justice Field, commenting on the validity of certain California statutes
excluding Chinese from citizenship and occupational endeavors, explained the forces
which produced such laws:
The discovery of gold in California in 1848 . . . was followed by a large im-
migration thither from all parts of the world, attracted not only by the hope
of gain from the mines, but from the great prices paid for all kinds of labor.
The news of the discovery penetrated China, and laborers came from there in
great numbers. . . . These laborers readily secured employment. . . . For
some years little opposition was made to them except when they sought work
in the mines, but, as their numbers increased, they began to engage in various
mechanical pursuits and trades, and thus came in competition with our artisans
and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the field.
The competition steadily increased as the laborers came in crowds on each
steamer that arrived from China... . Mhey were content with the simplest
fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and artisans. The competi-
tion between them and our people was for this reason altogether in their favor,
and the consequent irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, was followed,
in many cases, by open conflicts ...
In December, 1878, the convention which framed the present constitution
of California . . . took this subject up . . . setting forth, in substance, that
the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the material inter-
ests of the State, and upon public morals... and, was a menace to our civili-
zation.....
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1889).
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work is unconstitutional. While court decisions have reached similar
conclusions and made dicta accordingly, the task of eradicating this type
of discrimination is far from finished.
The piecemeal treatment by the courts has eliminated many stat-
utes and federal regulations in this area but many more remain on the
books. The case-by-case method is slow and incomplete in its coverage.
What is needed is legislation either in the form of an amendment to the
United States Constitution, or an act by Congress that would prohibit
discrimination against aliens in employment. Congress could amend
Title VII to specifically cover aliens. Of the two possibilities, the latter is
preferable. This author seriously doubts that an amendment to the
United States Constitution could gain enough support to be ratified. De-
spite the many sympathizers to the alien cause, when change may bring
about competition in employment, support would either vanish or be
insufficient to effect ratification of such an amendment. Moreover,
aliens are not allowed to vote; they have no political power to affect the
outcome of any measure that is determined by voters. Consequently the
fate of the aliens lies in the hands of Congress.
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